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Abstract
When the government regulates the time, place, or manner of speech, it
must satisfy intermediate scrutiny and prove that (1) it has a significant
interest, (2) the regulation is narrowly tailored, and (3) ample alternative
channels of expression remain open. This article advocates simplifying and
improving this test in First Amendment jurisprudence by replacing the
often-confused second and third prongs with the far less deferential and
much more rigorous undue-burden test embraced by the U.S. Supreme
Court in 2016 in the abortion-regulation case of Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt. Incorporating the undue-burden standard maintains
intermediate scrutiny’s balancing framework while simultaneously adding
significant muscle, in free-speech-friendly fashion, to the test. First
Amendment law long has borrowed from other constitutional domains, the
article explains. Under this fact-intensive, benefits-and-burdens tack to
intermediate scrutiny, the government must provide extensive factual
evidence to support its claims, and courts, in turn, must refrain from
deferring to lawmakers’ unsubstantiated assertions.
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Introduction
In a 2007 article examining tiers of scrutiny1 in First Amendment 2 free
speech jurisprudence, Professor Ashutosh Bhagwat observes that
intermediate scrutiny3 “has attained central importance in the overall
structure of free speech law.” 4 Bhagwat points out that intermediate
scrutiny “has been the standard of review in literally dozens of significant
Supreme Court and courts of appeals cases over the past quarter century.”5
Today, however, the entire tiers-of-review paradigm in First Amendment
law is under fire in some quarters,6 and the justices, at times, disagree on
1. The three traditional tiers of judicial scrutiny of government action in U.S.
constitutional law are strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational-basis review. See
Michael Stokes Paulsen, But Cf.: Medium Rare Scrutiny, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 397, 398
(1998) (proposing, somewhat waggishly, “a new taxonomy to replace the inscrutable
categories of ‘strict,’ ‘intermediate,’ and ‘rational basis’ scrutiny”); Christina E. Wells,
Trends in First Amendment Jurisprudence: Beyond Campaign Finance: The First
Amendment Implications of Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 66 MO. L. REV.
141, 158 (2001) (describing the U.S. Supreme “Court’s multi-tiered system of judicial
review” as consisting “of three levels of scrutiny—strict, intermediate, and rational basis—
all of which share the same general structure”).
2. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated more than
ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause as fundamental
liberties to apply as against state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
3. Several scholars have examined intermediate scrutiny of content-neutral laws,
including Leslie Kendrick. See Leslie Kendrick, Nonsense on Sidewalks: Content
Discrimination in McCullen v. Coakley, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 215, 238 (quoting Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) (observing that the intermediate-scrutiny
standard “has historically required that the law be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest’ and that it leave open ‘ample alternative channels of
communication’”).
4. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 785.
5. Id.
6. Justice Stephen Breyer, for instance, opined in 2015 that “[t]he First Amendment
requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the Amendment’s expressive objectives and to the
public’s legitimate need for regulation than a simple recitation of categories, such as ‘content
discrimination’ and ‘strict scrutiny,’ would permit.” Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct.
2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring). Breyer proposes a more general balancing
framework that asks “whether the regulation at issue works harm to First Amendment
interests that is disproportionate in light of the relevant regulatory objectives.” Id. at 223536. Framed slightly differently in another case, Breyer wrote that the Court “must sometimes
look beyond an initial categorization. And, in doing so, it helps to ask whether a government
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which standard of review applies in a given case.7 Furthermore, strict
scrutiny—what Professor David Han calls “the default rule” for “any
content-based regulation” 8—is proving somewhat less than fatal for statutes
than once believed,9 as indicated by the 2015 high court decision in
action burdens speech disproportionately in light of the action’s tendency to further a
legitimate government objective.” Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 484
(2009) (Breyer, J., concurring). Ultimately, Breyer contends that the Court’s doctrine
referring to tiers of scrutiny should be used only “as guidelines informing our approach to
the case at hand, not tests to be mechanically applied.” Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135
S. Ct. 1656, 1673 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring).
A complete discussion of Justice Breyer’s critique of First Amendment tiers of review is, of
course, beyond the scope of this article, but it suffices to say here that Harvard Professor
Mark Tushnet refers to Justice Breyer’s approach as signaling the “partial dedoctrinalization of the First Amendment.” Mark Tushnet, Justice Breyer and the Partial DeDoctrinalization of Free Speech Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 508, 511 (2014); see also Vikram
David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Voracious First Amendment: Alvarez and Knox in the
Context of 2012 and Beyond, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 491, 497 (2013) (noting that Breyer tends
to engage in a “free-form balancing approach”).
Others have criticized the tiers of scrutiny as well. See, e.g., R. George Wright, What if All
the Levels of Constitutional Scrutiny Were Completely Abandoned?, 45 U. MEM. L. REV.
165, 200 (2014) (“Tiered scrutiny inevitably invites overconfident judicial assessments of
how important or unimportant some government interests, conceived of in any of several
ways, ‘really’ are.”).
7. For example, in the abortion-facility buffer zone case of McCullen v. Coakley, 134
S. Ct. 2518 (2014), the five-justice majority concluded that the statute in question was
“neither content nor viewpoint based and therefore need not be analyzed under strict
scrutiny.” Id. at 2534. In brief, the majority found the statute was “content neutral.” Id. In
contrast, the late Justice Antonin Scalia contended in a concurring opinion that “content
neutrality is far from clear (the Court is divided 5-to-4).” Id. at 2542 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Scalia concluded “that the statute is content based and therefore subject to strict scrutiny.”
Id. at 2545.
8. David S. Han, Transparency in First Amendment Doctrine, 65 EMORY L.J. 359, 396
(2015).
9. The late professor Gerald Gunther famously suggested that under the leadership of
Chief Justice Earl Warren, some equal protection cases were subjected to a form of review
that “was ‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” Gerald Gunther, Forward, In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
8 (1972); see also Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687,
691-92 (2016) (“Describing the Supreme Court’s approach to content-based restrictions on
speech is superficially simple. Laws that suppress speech on the basis of content are subject
to the strictest constitutional scrutiny, which is often outcome determinative.” (emphasis
added)); David G. Post, Sex, Lies, and Videogames: Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association, 2010-11 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 27, 29–30 (noting that “every first-year law
student dutifully learns” that strict scrutiny “is not only substantial, it is well-nigh
insurmountable” (emphasis added)).
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Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar. 10 Additionally, strict scrutiny is variously
criticized as vague and under-theorized, 11 as well as “internally
variegated,” 12 “highly impressionistic and, at times, seemingly
indeterminate.” 13
The intermediate-scrutiny standard of review—the focus of this article
and the test generally applicable to content-neutral regulations 14 affecting
the time, place, and manner (“TPM”) of speech15—also finds itself caught
in the crosshairs of scholarly criticism. 16 For example, Professor Ronald
Krotoszynski asserts that
10. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (upholding, in the face of strict scrutiny and by a five-to-four
decision, a Florida Code of Judicial Conduct canon that forbids candidates for judicial office
in Florida from personally soliciting campaign funds). Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
John Roberts called it “one of the rare cases in which a speech restriction withstands strict
scrutiny.” Id. at 1666.
11. Professor Richard Fallon asserts that:
The incomplete theorization of the decision to adopt the strict scrutiny formula
as the baseline test for protecting fundamental rights lives on in the test’s
operative terms: They remain crucially vague and thus capable of varying
applications from one Justice and one case to another. The Supreme Court has
never squarely confronted, much less solved, the conundrum of the level of
generality at which to specify compelling governmental interests. Neither has
the Court noted the ambiguities built into the narrow tailoring requirement.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1336 (2007).
12. Aziz Z. Huq, Preserving Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. SIDEBAR 16, 16 (2012).
13. Matthew D. Bunker et al., Strict in Theory, but Feeble in Fact? First Amendment
Strict Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 349, 350 (2011).
14. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994) (observing that “laws
that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views
expressed are in most instances content neutral”); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)) (asserting that content-neutral laws are “those that ‘are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech’”).
15. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (finding that “even in
a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or
manner of protected speech,” and setting forth the intermediate-scrutiny test that applies to
such restrictions); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002)
(observing “that municipal ordinances receive only intermediate scrutiny if they are content
neutral”); see also Dan V. Kozlowski, Content and Viewpoint Discrimination: Malleable
Terms Beget Malleable Doctrine, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 131, 131–32 (2008) (asserting that
the Supreme Court “has devised tests to review content-based and content-neutral
regulations (strict scrutiny for content-based regulations, a more lenient intermediate
scrutiny for those regulations deemed content neutral)” (emphasis added)).
16. See, e.g., Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as
Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 301 (1998) (asserting that “intermediate
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[o]n its face, the time, place, and manner doctrine appears at
least fairly solicitous of free speech: A standard of review that is,
in essence, intermediate scrutiny presents a high bar indeed. As
the doctrine has evolved over time, however, the criteria set forth
by the Supreme Court often present the government with only
minor impediments—mere speed bumps along the path to
suppression of even core political speech.17
The Supreme Court fashioned today’s common iteration of intermediate
scrutiny more than thirty years ago in Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence. 18 There, the Court held that content-neutral laws pass
constitutional muster only if they are “narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest” 19 and “leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information.”20 Chief Justice John
Roberts reiterated this formulation of intermediate scrutiny in 2014 when
writing for the majority in McCullen v. Coakley. 21 Federal appellate courts
today also use this framing of intermediate scrutiny. 22
The Court, it should be noted, has articulated slightly different
formulations of intermediate scrutiny for symbolic speech regulations23 and
scrutiny has been consistently critiqued by judges and scholars who point to its
indeterminacy and its invitation to judicial activism”).
17. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Clint A. Carpenter, The Return of Seditious Libel, 55
UCLA L. REV. 1239, 1260 (2008).
18. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
19. Id. at 293.
20. Id.
21. 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014).
22. See, e.g., Lone Star Sec. & Video, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 827 F.3d 1192, 1197
(9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293) (asserting that “the government may impose
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in traditional public fora” if “the
restrictions are content neutral, are ‘narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest,’ and ‘leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information’”); Reynolds v. Middleton, 779 F.3d 222, 225–26 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 555 (4th Cir. 2013)) (“Content-neutral
time, place, and manner regulations of speech in traditional public forums are subject to
intermediate scrutiny—that is, the restrictions must be ‘narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest and leave open ample alternative channels of
communication.”).
23. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (observing, in the context of
a case involving the burning of a draft registration certificate, that a government regulation is
permissible “if it is within the constitutional power of the Government,” “furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest” that “is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
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restrictions imposed on truthful advertising. 24 Those versions of
intermediate scrutiny, however, are beyond the scope of this article, which
concentrates, instead, on intermediate scrutiny as applied to content-neutral
TPM regulations. 25
A content-neutral TPM regulation targets “the circumstances of speech
rather than the content of the speech.” 26 As the Supreme Court wrote in

greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest”); see also Susan Dente Ross,
Reconstructing First Amendment Doctrine: The 1990s Revolution of the Central Hudson and
O’Brien Tests, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 723, 729 (2001) (observing that “in United
States v. O’Brien, the Court refused to overturn a conviction for draft-card burning and
established the intermediate scrutiny test for content-neutral laws that incidentally infringe
symbolic speech”).
24. The U.S. Supreme Court adopted a four-part test for commercial speech that
requires courts to
determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servs. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (describing “the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson”);
Goldberg, supra note 9, at 705 (“Restrictions on truthful commercial speech are subject to
intermediate scrutiny, and can be regulated if the restriction directly advances a substantial
governmental interest and is substantially related to achieving the interest.”); Tamara R.
Piety, Market Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas: Commercial Speech and the Problem
That Won’t Go Away, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 181, 182 (2007) (“[T]he commercial speech
doctrine creates a category of speech subject to intermediate scrutiny under the First
Amendment.”).
25. Some scholars argue that the Supreme Court has collapsed the different
intermediate-scrutiny tests deployed for time, place, and manner regulations and symbolic
speech “into a single, combined standard that apparently applies to almost all cases
involving content-neutral regulations.” Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the
First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 636 (1991); see Bhagwat, supra note 4, at 802
(asserting that there is “no doubt that the courts of appeals increasingly seem to accept the
existence of a single, overarching standard of First Amendment scrutiny called ‘intermediate
scrutiny,’ which has emerged as a synthesis of the various distinct bodies of Supreme Court
doctrine”); Nancy J. Whitmore, The Evolution of the Intermediate Scrutiny Standard and the
Rise of the Bottleneck “Rule” in the Turner Decisions, 8 COMM. L. & POL’Y 25, 82–83
(2003) (describing “the Supreme Court’s practice of conflating the O’Brien rule and the
time, place and manner standard”).
26. Williams, supra note 25, at 637.
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Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 27 “[a] regulation that serves purposes
unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an
incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”28
The strict- and intermediate-scrutiny standards both focus on government
interests and narrow tailoring. In strict scrutiny, the government interest
must be compelling, 29 while in intermediate scrutiny it need only be
significant. 30 In terms of the tailoring or fit between the government’s
asserted interest and the statute that serves it, strict scrutiny demands that
the statute restricts no more speech than is absolutely necessary to serve the
interest, 31 while the fit does not need to be quite so precise under
intermediate scrutiny. 32
The intermediate-scrutiny test, however, adds a third consideration or
prong not found in strict scrutiny—namely, that the regulation “leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” 33 As
Professor R. George Wright observes in a 2015 article, “It seems well
settled that content-neutral, but not content-based, restrictions on speech
must leave ample alternative channels available for conveying the speaker’s
message.” 34 Professor Susan Williams concurs, noting that “the adequate
alternatives branch of the test is unique.” 35
27. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
28. Id. at 791 (emphasis added).
29. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (observing that strict
scrutiny demands that a regulation “is justified by a compelling government interest and is
narrowly drawn to serve that interest” (emphasis added)).
30. See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014).
31. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“If a less
restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that
alternative.” (emphasis added)); Sable Commc’ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The
Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order
to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the
articulated interest.” (emphasis added)); see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech,
Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2422
(1996) (“A law is not narrowly tailored if there are less speech-restrictive means available
that would serve the interest essentially as well as would the speech restriction.”).
32. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 798 (explaining that “a regulation of the time, place, or
manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate,
content-neutral interests but that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means
of doing so” (emphasis added)).
33. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
34. R. George Wright, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of Speech: A
Distinction That Is No Longer Worth the Fuss, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2081, 2088 (2015) (emphasis
added). The ample-alternative-avenues-of-communication prong is not, however, part of the
intermediate scrutiny test fashioned by the Supreme Court in United States v. O’Brien, 391
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Intermediate scrutiny’s alternative-channels-of-communication prong
comports with Professor Geoffrey Stone’s observation three decades ago
that “[t]he Court’s analysis of content-neutral restrictions is designed
primarily to assure that adequate opportunities for free expression remain
open and available. This is essential for the preservation of a vital and
robust public debate.” 36 Finding alternative avenues of communication for
speech today, Professor Patrick Garry contends, should be relatively easier
than in the past due to “the proliferation of alternative channels for
communication” 37 and, in particular, to the “explosive growth of new
communications technologies.” 38
Professor Wright, however, asserts that a critical problem wrought by
this third prong is “the difficulty of distinguishing the idea of alternative
speech channels from the genuinely separate idea of one degree or another
of narrow tailoring.” 39 The key distinction between the second and third
prongs of intermediate scrutiny, Wright points out, is that narrow tailoring
forces courts to consider “alternative government regulations of speech,” 40
while the third prong concentrates on the alternative methods of
communication that remain available in the face of the government
regulation. 41 Put differently, the second prong (narrow tailoring) compels
courts to consider alternative ways to regulate the speech at issue, while the
third prong directs them to contemplate alternative means and modes to
communicate that speech.
The Supreme Court indicated more than two decades ago in City of
Ladue v. Gilleo 42 that the ample-alternative-channels prong entails

U.S. 367 (1968), for cases involving symbolic speech. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Free
Speech, Occupational Speech, and Psychotherapy, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681, 703 (2016)
(citing Ward, 491 U.S. at 791) (“Assuming the government’s claim of content-neutrality is
justified, it may regulate the time, place, and manner of speech whenever this restriction is
‘narrowly tailored to a significant government interest’ and ‘leave[s] open[] ample
alternative channels of communication’ (an additional factor not in O’Brien’s version of
intermediate scrutiny).” (alterations in original)).
35. Williams, supra note 25, at 644.
36. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 117 (1987).
37. Patrick M. Garry, The First Amendment and Non-Political Speech: Exploring a
Constitutional Model That Focuses on the Existence of Alternative Channels of
Communication, 72 MO. L. REV. 477, 524 (2007).
38. Id. at 504.
39. Wright, supra note 34, at 2090 (footnote omitted).
40. Id. at 2091.
41. Id.
42. 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
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considering whether “adequate substitutes exist” 43 for conveying a message
when compared to the mode of communication the government “has closed
off.” 44 Whether a substitute mode of communication is adequate, the Court
noted, requires evaluation of its cost and convenience,45 as well as its
effectiveness in conveying a message to a speaker’s targeted or desired
audience.46
Perhaps even more troubling regarding the ample-alternative-channels
prong than its conflation with the narrow-tailoring facet, Professor Wright
contends, is that it carries the bizarre47 potential to transform intermediate
scrutiny into a more rigorous standard of review than strict scrutiny. 48 He
reasons here that
a requirement that a regulation leave open anything such as
ample alternative speech channels in the case of content-neutral
speech regulations immediately destroys any hierarchy of rigor,
exactingness, or stringency between the two tests. Nothing
prevents a court, relying on the ample available alternative
43. Id. at 56.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 57 (noting that the mode of communication closed off in Gilleo—namely,
residential yard signs—constitutes “an unusually cheap and convenient form of
communication. Especially for persons of modest means or limited mobility, a yard or
window sign may have no practical substitute”).
46. See id. (“Furthermore, a person who puts up a sign at her residence often intends to
reach neighbors, an audience that could not be reached nearly as well by other means.”).
47. The authors use the term “bizarre” because intermediate scrutiny is supposed to be a
less demanding standard of review than strict scrutiny. As Professor Jeffrey Shaman
explains:
Whereas strict scrutiny requires the showing of a compelling state interest to
sustain a law, intermediate scrutiny prescribes a less demanding standard that
calls for the showing of an important or substantial state interest to sustain a
law. And while strict scrutiny requires that legislative means be absolutely
necessary to accomplish their ends, intermediate scrutiny expects that
legislative means be carefully tailored, though not absolutely necessary, to
accomplish their ends. In practice, intermediate scrutiny has proven to be less
severe than strict scrutiny and in numerous cases when using intermediate
scrutiny the Court has upheld laws challenged on First Amendment grounds.
Jeffrey M. Shaman, Rules of General Applicability, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 419, 461
(2012) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
48. Wright, supra note 34, at 2092 (asserting that “an alternative speech channels
requirement can impose different and more stringent free speech requirements than can even
the most exacting narrow tailoring requirements,” such that “a content-neutral regulation test
requiring ample alternative speech channels can be more demanding than a content-based
regulation test requiring a compelling interest and narrow tailoring”).
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speech channels requirement, from imposing a more demanding
test under content-neutrality than under a content-based test. 49
This possibility arises, in part, because of the malleable and amorphous
meaning of “ample” in assessment of alternative channels of
communication. Wright avers here that “there is room for judicial discretion
in applying the test in practice, as well as generous room for variations in
how, precisely, this requirement is to be formulated in the first place.”50 He
notes that in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 51 the majority and
dissent deployed several different and competing interpretations of what is
necessary to satisfy the ample-alternative-channels prong. 52 This comports
with Boston University Professor Jay Wexler’s more general observation
that the intermediate-scrutiny test is “particularly vulnerable to
manipulation by the Supreme Court.” 53
If Professor Wright is correct that the ample-alternative-channels facet of
intermediate scrutiny serves “to undermine the meaningfulness of the
judicially created binary distinction between content-neutral and contentbased regulations of speech,” 54 then either one of two things must happen to
remedy the predicament. One possibility—an extreme one 55—is for the
Supreme Court simply to jettison the distinction between content-neutral
and content-based laws altogether and, in its place, perhaps adopt
something akin to Justice Stephen Breyer’s proportionality approach for
considering the constitutionality of all laws targeting speech.56 An
alternative tack—the one proposed here for scholarly consideration—is to
reformulate the tests for either or both intermediate and strict scrutiny in
such a way that the distinction between content-neutral and content-based
laws and, in turn, between intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny,
becomes meaningful. In addition, such a reformulation must ensure that

49. Id. at 2089.
50. Id. at 2093 (footnote omitted).
51. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
52. Wright, supra note 34, at 2093.
53. Wexler, supra note 16, at 301.
54. Wright, supra note 34, at 2101–02.
55. The authors consider this an extreme approach because “[c]onstitutional law
students, professors, and judges alike are infatuated with the notion of tiers of scrutiny.” Josh
Blackman, The Burden of Judging, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1105, 1193 (2014).
56. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (addressing Justice Breyer’s
proportionality approach).
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intermediate scrutiny is meaningfully different and more rigorous than a
mere rational basis standard. 57
Specifically, this article proposes leaving intact the current strict-scrutiny
standard—the government must continue to prove both a compelling
interest and that the means serving it restrict no more speech than is
necessary—but reworking the intermediate-scrutiny test. In particular, this
article recommends retaining the significant-interest component of
intermediate scrutiny but discarding both the narrow-tailoring and amplealternative-channels prongs of the test.
In their place, the authors advocate implementing a version of the
Supreme Court’s undue-burden test. It was most recently applied by the
majority in June 2016 in the abortion-restriction case of Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt 58 and first adopted twenty-five years ago in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 59
In brief, the authors’ proposed intermediate-scrutiny test has two prongs,
rather than the current three. This simplifies matters and avoids conflation
of the second and third prongs of the current intermediate-scrutiny test. The
proposed standard requires the government to prove both that it has a
significant interest in regulating speech and that the regulation it adopts
does not impose an undue burden on First Amendment interests. Thus, as
suggested here and as compared to the current strict-scrutiny test, the
standards would be

Strict Scrutiny
compelling interest served by the least speech-restrictive
means possible
Intermediate Scrutiny
significant interest served without causing an undue
burden on speech

57. Although purportedly a more stringent standard than rational basis review,
intermediate scrutiny does not always live up to that billing. See Lillian R. BeVier, The First
Amendment on the Tracks: Should Justice Breyer Be at the Switch?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1280,
1293 (2005) (asserting that “intermediate scrutiny has become the practical equivalent of
lenient, rational basis review”).
58. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
59. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

634

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:623

Part I of the article provides a primer on the evolution of the undueburden standard within the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence,
concentrating on the Court’s significant development of that test’s meaning
in Hellerstedt. Part II then illustrates that First Amendment jurisprudence
long has borrowed standards from other constitutional domains, thus
providing context for the article’s proposal to import into free speech law a
component of the Court’s abortion-related jurisprudence. Next, Part III
explores the potential application of the undue-burden standard in the realm
of First Amendment intermediate scrutiny, attempting to identify variables
and factors that courts might use in determining if, in fact, a content-neutral
regulation imposes an undue burden on speech. Finally, Part IV concludes
by encapsulating the potential of the undue-burden standard to improve
First Amendment intermediate scrutiny and by calling for other scholars to
offer suggestions for how the undue-burden test might be adjusted and finetuned to fit within the free-speech framework.
I. Abortion and the Constitutional Right to Choose: Evolution
of the Undue-Burden Test
The origins of the undue-burden standard trace back more than half a
century to Griswold v. Connecticut. 60 In the case, just as in Hellerstedt,
Planned Parenthood found itself embroiled in a reproductive-rights
controversy before the Supreme Court.61 Griswold challenged the
prosecution of a physician and the executive director of the Planned
Parenthood League of Connecticut, both of whom ran afoul of two Nutmeg
State laws 62 criminalizing the use (or abetting the use) of contraceptives. 63
At issue was whether the statutes violated the Fourteenth Amendment and,
more specifically as framed for the majority by Justice William O.
Douglas, 64 whether prohibiting the dissemination of information regarding
60. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
61. Id. at 480.
62. In particular, the statutes provided that “[a]ny person who uses any drug, medicinal
article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than
fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined
and imprisoned,” and “[a]ny person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands
another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal
offender.” CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (repealed 1971).
63. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
64. Justice Douglas initially framed the issue as a Fourteenth Amendment matter,
writing that “we are met with a wide range of questions that implicate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 481. He ultimately decided the case, however,
using multiple amendments. Id. at 484.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss4/2

2017]

THE UNDUE-BURDEN STANDARD

635

contraceptives violated the “sacred precincts of marital bedrooms” 65 in
contravention of the Due Process Clause. 66
Although Douglas had, in the words of Professor Kenneth Karst, “a
number of more traditional doctrinal threads” from which to choose, he
instead wove “the opinion from gossamer of his own.” 67 In six poignant
pages, Douglas knit a unifying thread through precepts of the First, Third,68
Fourth, 69 Fifth, 70 and Ninth 71 Amendments 72 to declare that “the right of
privacy which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one.”73
In the process of invalidating the Connecticut laws, the Douglas majority
did not rely on fundamental liberty interests under the Due Process Clause,
but rather on the “penumbras, formed by emanations” from the Bill of
Rights that give the right to privacy “life and substance.”74 By taking this
indirect and much-maligned 75 approach to recognizing the constitutional
65. Id. at 485.
66. Id. at 481.
67. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 653
(1980).
68. The Third Amendment to the U.S. Constitution establishes that “[n]o Soldier shall,
in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of
war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.” U.S. CONST. amend. III.
69. The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment was
incorporated more than half a century ago through the Due Process Clause as a fundamental
freedom to apply to all government actors. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
70. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o
person shall. . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment right not to be a witness against oneself was
incorporated about fifty ago through the Due Process Clause as a fundamental liberty to
apply as against all state agents and agencies. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
71. The Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, in its entirety, that “[t]he
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
72. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
73. Id. at 485.
74. Id. at 484.
75. See, e.g., Robert G. Dixon, The “New” Substantive Due Process and the
Democratic Ethic: a Prolegomenon, 1976 BYU L. REV. 43, 84 (wryly referring to how
Justice Douglas “skipped through the Bill of Rights like a cheerleader—‘Give me a P . . .
Give me an R . . . Give me an I . . .’ and so on, and found P-R-I-V-A-C-Y as a derivative or
penumbral right”).
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guarantee of privacy, Douglas attempted to distance himself from the
stigma of Lochner-era 76 substantive due process 77 claims, 78 which similarly
fostered the discovery and fundamentalization of unenumerated rights from
normative cultural elements. 79
76. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), invalidated a New York statute limiting
the number of hours bakers could work each week. The Court concluded the law interfered
with the fundamental-yet-unenumerated liberty of contract between workers and their
employers. Id. at 64. Lochner spurred the Court into a three-decade span of increased
judicial intervention into economically related legislative action, commonly known as the
Lochner era. This jurisprudential zeitgeist, which emphasized substantive due process claims
and dominated early twentieth-century jurisprudence, has since received significant criticism
from legal scholars. As Stephen Kanter explained:
Lochner and its economic substantive due process doctrine have become
constitutional boogeymen. It is difficult to find anyone with a good word to say
about the extent of the Court’s Lochnerian interventionist period. The critics of
Lochner do not always agree on the precise defects of economic substantive
due process, but the nearly universal rejection of the doctrine . . . serves as an
important cautionary flag for any theory of substantive individual liberty rights
that looks primarily to the Due Process Clause as the source of those rights.
Stephen Kanter, The Griswold Diagrams: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Rights,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 671 (2006) (footnote omitted).
77. Substantive due process claims, which use the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to address whether the government has a justifiable rationale for depriving a
person’s life, liberty, or property, are perhaps best explained by the late Chief Justice
William Rehnquist. He wrote, “[W]e have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause
specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’
such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’” Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (citations omitted) (first quoting Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); then quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325, 326 (1937)). This method of finding fundamental enumerated rights, although
controversial, is part of standard constitutional doctrine. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 571–73 (5th ed. 2015).
78. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481–82 (opining that “[o]vertones of some arguments
suggest that Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, should be our guide. But we decline that
invitation . . . . We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and
propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions”).
79. See Helen Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review: Haunted by the Ghost
of Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293, 305 (1986) (explaining that “Justice Douglas wrote the
opinion of the Court, using the penumbra rationale to avoid the stigma of Lochner. Three
other justices wrote concurring opinions, leaving the Griswold rationale in fragmented
confusion” (footnotes omitted)); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, at 850 (“In an
attempt to avoid substantive due process, Douglas, who had lived through the Lochner era,
found privacy in the ‘penumbra’ of the Bill of Rights. This approach has been much
criticized and has not been followed by subsequent cases.”).
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Less than a decade later, the Supreme Court used part of Griswold’s
rationale as a launching pad 80 to address the constitutionality of abortion
itself in Roe v. Wade. 81 The case challenged a Texas law banning abortions
except in instances implicating the mother’s life.82 Writing for the majority,
Justice Harry Blackmun first established that the choice to obtain an
abortion is an inherently private matter.83 He then reasoned that because
Griswold established privacy as a fundamental right, abortion, which is
subsumed within privacy, is likewise fundamental. 84 Weighing the interests
in strict-scrutiny-like fashion, 85 Blackmun explained that whenever
“‘fundamental rights’ are involved, the Court has held that regulation
limiting these rights may be justified only by a ‘compelling state interest,’
and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the
legitimate state interests at stake.”86
Once the fundamental nature of abortion rights was established,
Blackmun qualified their scope in light of competing interests.87 He
explained that
a State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding
health, in maintaining medical standards, and in protecting
potential life. At some point in pregnancy, these respective
interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of
the factors that govern the abortion decision. The privacy right
involved, therefore, cannot be said to be absolute.88

80. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the
Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 55 (2003) (“Griswold was
a particularly important step toward the Court’s announcement and enforcement of a
woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy in Roe v. Wade.”).
81. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
82. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 1191, 1192, 1193, 1194, 1196, invalidated by Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
83. Roe, 410 U.S. at 151–52.
84. Id. at 154–55.
85. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, at 855 (explaining that the “Court said that strict
scrutiny was to be used in striking the balance because the right to abortion was a
fundamental right”).
86. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (citations omitted).
87. In this case, Justice Blackmun opined, the Texas statutes furthered legitimate
government interests, yet they also went too far and “outstripped these justifications and
swept ‘far beyond any areas of compelling state interest.’” Id. at 156 (quoting Roe v. Wade,
314 F. Supp. 1217, 1222-23 (1970), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
88. Id. at 154.
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The “some point in pregnancy” at which governmental interests of
prenatal life and maternal health and safety89 reach sufficient importance
was the second trimester. 90 Attempting to balance all the interests involved,
then, Roe established a trimester-based approach to ascertaining the
constitutionality of abortion regulations.
In the first trimester, governments could only regulate abortions akin to
any other medical procedure—i.e., mandating their performance by
licensed doctors. 91 The onset of the second trimester, however, triggered a
trio of compelling governmental interests in maternal health, safety, and
prenatal life, thus allowing governments to regulate—although not entirely
restrict—abortions. 92 At the start of the third trimester, Justice Blackmun
explained, “the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human
life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion.” 93
The constitutional basis for the trimester framework deviated sharply
from the penumbral rationale that gave the right of privacy constitutional
footing in Griswold. Blackmun relocated the unenumerated right of privacy
into the purview of substantive due process, 94 a decision that attracted
critics from both the pro-choice and pro-life camps. 95
89. The Court attempted to establish that, based upon available data, abortions
performed after the second trimester were more likely to result in health-compromising
complications. Id. at 163.
90. Foreshadowing what would transpire nearly two decades later in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the Roe Court
stated that, “[w]ith respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life,
the ‘compelling’ point is at viability.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. Yet the established proxy for
viability became the rigid, trimester-based framework. Id.
91. Id. at 150.
92. Id. The Court further explained that “[t]hese interests are separate and distinct. . . .
[A]t a point during pregnancy, each becomes ‘compelling.’ With respect to the State’s
important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the ‘compelling’ point, in the
light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester.” Id. at
162-63.
93. Id. at 164–65. Justice Blackmun added a caveat here, however, stating that abortions
may only be proscribed “except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for
the preservation of the life or health of the mother.” Id. at 165.
94. See id. at 153 (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is,
or . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
95. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 386 (1985) (suggesting that the Roe rationale was
“weakened” by a reliance upon the Due Process Clause, rather than the Equal Protection
Clause); see also David Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the
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The inconsistently applied, sliding-scale, strict scrutiny of the trimester
framework was likewise criticized in the years that followed. 96 It would be
almost twenty years after Roe, however, before the Court fully re-visited
the trimester scheme’s constitutional implications. The intervening period
saw lively debate, both on and off the Supreme Court bench.97
Shortly after her confirmation in 1981, for instance, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor predicted both the collapse of the trimester framework and the
adoption of the undue-burden standard almost a decade before they
occurred. 98 An “‘unduly burdensome’ standard should be applied to the
challenged regulations throughout the entire pregnancy without reference to
the particular ‘stage’ of pregnancy involved,” the first female Supreme
Court justice wrote in her dissent in City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health. 99 “If the particular regulation does not ‘unduly
burden’ the fundamental right, then our evaluation of that regulation is
limited to our determination that the regulation rationally relates to a
legitimate state purpose,” 100 she elaborated.
O’Connor and others--such as Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who echoed her
reasoning 101--criticized not only the difficulties with the trimester approach,
Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 56 (2003) (contending that
“Griswold and Roe’s protection of the unenumerated right to privacy raises many of the
same issues as Lochner’s protection of the unenumerated right to liberty of contract”).
96. See, e.g., R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Planned Parenthood v. Casey Abortion
Rights Law: Strict Scrutiny for Substantial Obstacles on Abortion Choice and Otherwise
Reasonableness Balancing, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 75, 80, 82 (2015) (puzzling over the fact
that “[u]nder Roe v. Wade, any burden on that woman’s fundamental right triggered a strict
scrutiny approach,” although in the 1970s within other contexts, such as parental-notification
statutes, the “Court appeared to apply intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny”).
97. See generally MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE (2015) (discussing the ideological battle
over abortion that raged in the 1970s). See also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976)
(upholding on procedural grounds a Massachusetts law that required minors to obtain
consent from their parents prior to terminating their pregnancies—and foreshadowing the
undue-burden test by stating that “a requirement of written consent on the part of a pregnant
adult is not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion”). Three
years later, the Court revisited the matter and held that states may require parental
notification prior to a minor obtaining an abortion, yet such rules require corresponding
allowances for alternative channels to parental approval, such as seeking a judge’s approval
instead. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979).
98. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. Id. (citation omitted).
101. Ginsburg, supra note 95, at 381 (quoting large passages of Justice O’Connor’s
opinions).
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but also the irony of the ostensibly rigid trimester standard: “Just as
improvements in medical technology inevitably will move forward the
point at which the State may regulate for reasons of maternal health,”
Justice O’Connor pointed out, “different technological improvements will
move backward the point of viability . . . . The Roe framework, then, is
clearly on a collision course with itself.” 102
Indeed, the collision occurred in 1992 in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 103 The case examined the
constitutionality of Pennsylvania laws that mandated, among other items,
twenty-four-hour waiting periods and spousal notifications for women
seeking abortions. 104 Although the constitutionality of abortion itself was
putatively not open for reconsideration in Casey, the post-Roe addition of
several conservative justices suggested to many that Roe’s central holding
was in jeopardy. 105
Writing for the Casey plurality, however, Justices Sandra Day O’Connor,
Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter declared that ignoring nineteen years
of stare decisis by overturning Roe would harm judicial legitimacy. 106
Therefore, to maintain both jurisprudential integrity and the abortion-liberty
interest, the Casey Court, in the words of Mary Ziegler, “steered a middle
course.” 107 It upheld the essence of Roe, yet permitted certain abortion
restrictions to stand. 108

102. City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 456-58.
103. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
104. Id. at 844. The five provisions at issue were: (1) mandatory twenty-four-hour
informed consent for those seeking abortions; (2) spousal notice requirement for those
seeking abortions; (3) parental consent for minors seeking abortions; (4) reporting and
record-keeping requirements for abortion providers; and (5) the definition of the phrase
“medical emergency” for abortion-related purposes. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203–20 (1990).
105. See ZIEGLER, supra note 97, at 224 (“Over the course of the 1980s, Republican
nominees to the Supreme Court expressed increasing skepticism about the trimester
framework set out in the Roe decision. By 1992 Court watchers concluded that the justices
might be ready to overrule the 1973 opinion.”).
106. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867 (“The country’s loss of confidence in the Judiciary would be
underscored by an equally certain and equally reasonable condemnation for another failing
in overruling unnecessarily and under pressure.”).
107. ZIEGLER, supra note 97, at 224.
108. The spousal-awareness provision was struck down, while the other four parts
survived. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879–911.
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At bottom, the fractured 109 Casey Court made two key decisions. First, it
reaffirmed Roe’s rationale that the onset of viability refashions the interests
and rights involved, but abandoned the trimester approach as a proxy for
viability. 110 Second, the Court jettisoned strict scrutiny from abortion
jurisprudence 111 and replaced it with the undue-burden standard. 112 The
plurality introduced the new test by explaining that an “undue burden
exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is
to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
before the fetus attains viability.” 113
This innovative balancing test, described by the plurality as an
“appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s
constitutionally protected liberty,” 114 would not be triggered by mere
attendant effects. Indeed, the Court opined that
[n]umerous forms of state regulation might have the incidental
effect of increasing the cost or decreasing the availability of
medical care, whether for abortion or any other medical
procedure. The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one
not designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental effect
of making it more difficult or more expensive to procure an
abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.115
Aside, however, from particular statements declaring certain parts of the
Pennsylvania law as either unduly burdensome or not, the opinion clarified
little about what the new standard practically entailed.116 An additional
109. See Elizabeth A. Schneider, Comment, Workability of the Undue Burden Test, 66
TEMP. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (1993) (“No less than three different rationales are used by
members of the Casey Court in analyzing the Pennsylvania provisions upheld in Casey.”).
110. Casey, 505 U.S at 878.
111. Id. Although they concurred in the holding itself, Justices Harry Blackmun and John
Paul Stevens would have retained both the trimester approach and the use of strict scrutiny
in abortion cases. See id. at 930 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Strict scrutiny of state
limitations on reproductive choice still offers the most secure protection of the woman’s
right to make her own reproductive decisions . . . . [T]he trimester framework ha[s] not been
undermined, and the Roe framework is far more administrable, and far less manipulable,
than the ‘undue burden’ standard.” (citation omitted)).
112. Id. at 874 (plurality opinion).
113. Id. at 878 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 876.
115. Id. at 874.
116. See Schneider, supra note 109, at 1004 (explaining one year after the Casey decision
that abortion rights were going to be curtailed because the “discretionary nature of the undue
burden test renders it unworkable. It is a standard which cannot be applied by state courts
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troubling aspect of the opinion was that the scant explanation tended to be
confusing and self-referential. After explaining, for instance, that the
undue-burden concept is a heuristic for illegitimate government intent that
abridges a fundamental right, the Court somewhat circularly stated that “[a]
finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion.” 117
After allowing for three years of ferment, Professor Erin Daly
summarized Casey in less-than-flattering terms:
Casey is a remarkably splintered and confusing opinion . . . . The
lead opinion is so fractured that, as the maze of concurrences and
dissents illustrate, there is something in it for everyone to hate.
Indeed, Casey has received almost nothing but criticism: prolifers have derided its continued protection of abortion, while
pro-choicers have lamented its support of significant abortion
restrictions. 118
Adoption of the undue-burden standard, in particular, received
significant criticism. Aside from the lack of clarity regarding how many
women a regulation must affect to constitute an undue burden, 119 another
common critique was the lack of clarity regarding the degree of causation
necessary between a regulation and the putative burden it created. The
Court “seems to be saying,” constitutional scholar Erwin Chemerinsky
wrote more than a decade after Casey,

consistently, predictably, and without prejudice. The Casey Court’s test invites judges to
roam freely where speculation might take them” (footnote omitted)); see also Kelso, supra
note 96, at 76–79 (describing practical difficulties that lower courts experienced in the
ensuing years in applying the vaguely articulated undue-burden standard).
117. Casey, 505 U.S at 877. Another tail-chasing trouble, Erwin Chemerinsky points out,
is that the Court
says both that the state cannot act with the purpose of creating obstacles to
abortion and that it can act with the purpose of discouraging abortion and
encouraging childbirth. . . . How is it to be decided which of these laws is
invalid as an undue burden and which is permissible? The joint opinion simply
says that the regulation “must not be an undue burden on the right.” But this, of
course, is circular.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 77, at 864 (emphasis added).
118. Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77, 80 (1995) (footnote omitted).
119. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 864 (commenting on the Court’s use of the phrase
“significant number of women” in the undue-burden analysis).
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that an undue burden exists only if there is proof that the
regulation will keep someone from getting an abortion.
However, it must be questioned why burdens, no matter how
substantial, are allowed unless they are actually proven to
prevent abortions. Also, it is unclear how challengers will be
able to prove that particular regulations create insurmountable
obstacles to obtaining abortions.120
Although the Court had several opportunities 121 to clarify some of these
ambiguities in the ensuing years, it remained mum until almost a quartercentury later in 2016 when it decided Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt. 122 Billed by Professor Jessie Hill as “the most important
abortion case in over two decades,”123 Hellerstedt involved a challenge to
two Texas laws adopted in 2013. The first required physicians who perform
abortions to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles, 124
while the second required that abortion clinics comply with state
regulations governing ambulatory surgical centers.125
Texas contended that the statutes were a legitimate use of its power to
further important interests in health and safety. 126 Austin-based Whole
Woman’s Health, a self-described “privately-owned feminist organization,
committed to providing holistic care for women,” 127 countered that the laws
were unduly burdensome on fundamental reproductive rights by essentially
regulating half of Texas’s abortion facilities out of business.128
Writing for a five-to-three majority, Stephen Breyer focused much
attention on analyzing a lengthy factual record. In so doing, he concluded
that enforcement of the admitting-privileges requirement would indeed

120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood,
546 U.S. 320 (2006); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
122. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
123. Jessie Hill, Some Thoughts About Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,
PRAWFSBLAWG (July 5, 2016), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/07/somethoughts-about-whole-womans-health-v-hellerstedt.html.
124. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031(a)(1)(A)) (2009); 25 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 139.53(c)(1), 139.56(a)(1) (2013).
125. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 245.010(a) (West Cum. Supp. 2015); 25 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 139.40 (2013).
126. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2300–01.
127. About Us, WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH, http://wholewomanshealth.com/about-us.html
(last visited May 12, 2017).
128. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2313.
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cause the closure of roughly half of Texas’s abortion clinics.129 The
surgical-center requirement, likewise, was determined to inhibit access to
reproductive care while simultaneously offering women little benefit, by
way of health or safety, in return.130 The laws were thus deemed
unconstitutional,131 with Justice Breyer writing that each statute both
“places a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking a previability
abortion” 132 and “constitutes an undue burden on abortion access.” 133
The day after the decision, Supreme Court reporter Adam Liptak mused
that “[i]f Casey limited the right established in Roe, allowing states to
regulate abortion in ways Roe had barred, [Hellerstedt] effectively
expanded that right.” 134 Indeed, Professor Hill explained that “[b]y focusing
on the health benefits of the law in relation to the burdens, the Court made
sense of, and breathed new life into, the undue burden standard.” 135 It did
this in three important and practical ways that give teeth to the undueburden test. 136
First, the Court added Roe-like rigor to the standard by reshaping it—at
least the means-end fit of it 137—in a strict-scrutiny-like construction. 138 In
particular, Justice Breyer declared that even if a statute does not impose a
“substantial obstacle” to abortion access, it must nonetheless be more than
“reasonably related to (or designed to further) a legitimate state interest.” 139
This means that even if a regulation furthers a “legitimate” interest, the

129. Id.
130. Id. at 2315.
131. Id. at 2320.
132. Id. at 2300.
133. Id.
134. Adam Liptak, Justices Overturn Texas Abortion Limits, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2016,
at A1.
135. Hill, supra note 123.
136. As Georgetown Professor David Cole writes, the Hellerstedt “decision gives teeth to
the ‘undue burden’ standard that the court announced in 1992 in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.” David Cole, Justice Kennedy’s Surprisingly Open Mind, WASH. POST (June 27,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/justice-kennedys-surpisingly-open-mind/
2016/06/27/6e217886-3c98-11e6-84e8-1580c7db5275_story.html.
137. See infra notes 148–153 and accompanying text (explaining how the undue-burden
test, although similar to strict scrutiny, deviates from the Court’s most exacting standard in
that the undue-burden test is more holistic).
138. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining how the decision
“transform[ed] the undue-burden test to something much more akin to strict scrutiny”).
139. Id. at 2309 (majority opinion).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/iss4/2

2017]

THE UNDUE-BURDEN STANDARD

645

nexus between the regulation and the interest must be exceptionally strong
in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 140
The second clarification regards deference. Specifically, it instructs
lower courts that, when an abortion regulation’s justifications are not
medically certain, they should not defer to lawmakers’ judgments. 141
Instead, reviewing courts should engage in careful assessment to determine
the compellingness and interest-regulation linkage by scrutinizing the
record itself. 142 As Justice Breyer wrote, the undue-burden test entails
placing “considerable weight upon evidence and argument presented in
judicial proceedings.” 143
Professor Hill thus asserts Breyer’s “opinion made it clear that courts are
not to defer to legislatures on the medical or scientific issues that underlie
abortion restrictions; instead, they should examine the evidence
independently and critically.” 144 The result, contends Professor Mary
Ziegler, is a “more rigorous undue burden test. . . . That means that
legislatures claiming to protect women’s health will need proof that a law
actually does so.” 145 Similarly, former Supreme Court reporter and current
Yale Law School lecturer Linda Greenhouse writes that Hellerstedt
mandates that “evidence-based medicine meets evidence-based law.” 146
The third change to the undue-burden standard is more general, but still
very important. It restructures the test to be more holistic and
comprehensive in nature, which should not be surprising in an opinion
authored by Justice Breyer. 147 This doctrinal amendment requires courts not
only to examine the burdens imposed on abortion but also to “consider the
burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those

140. Id.
141. Id. at 2310.
142. Id.
143. Id. For instance, in evaluating the admitting-privileges requirement, Breyer cited
evidence in the judicial record including peer-reviewed studies, expert testimony, and data
from friend-of-the-court briefs. Id. at 2311–14.
144. Hill, supra note 123.
145. Mary Ziegler, The Supreme Court’s Texas Abortion Ruling Reignites a Battle over
Facts, WASH. POST (June 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/
2016/06/28/the-supreme-courts-texas-abortion-ruling-reignites-a-battle-over-facts/?utm_ te
rm=.714b92e221f2.
146. Linda Greenhouse, The Facts Win Out on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/opinion/the-facts-win-out-on-abortion.html.
147. See supra note 6 for a discussion of Justice Breyer’s propensity toward “free-form
balancing.”
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laws confer.” 148 Whereas the Court in Casey only evaluated the burdens
imposed on obtaining an abortion, the Hellerstedt majority requires these
burdens to be weighed against the alleged benefits of the regulation.149 In
brief, the burdens and benefits must be balanced.150 Justice Breyer thus
lauded the district court in Hellerstedt for applying “the correct legal
standard” 151 when it gave “significant weight to evidence in the judicial
record,” 152 including expert testimony, and “then weighed the asserted
benefits against the burdens.” 153
Collectively, these changes make the undue-burden test a far more
rigorous test for evaluating government restrictions and provide courts—
even appellate courts—with a large degree of discretion to engage in
detailed factual analyses.154 The practical upshot is, in the words of
Professor Ziegler, that any future challenges to abortion rights are going to
become “a battle over facts,” 155 forcing supporters of abortion regulations
to have more (and more persuasive) evidence of the regulations’ benefits in
order to demonstrate their constitutionality. 156
148. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2309 (emphasis added). Practically, Justice Breyer
explained, this simply means engaging in a balancing test. Justice Breyer’s full quotation
states that the undue-burden standard requires that lower courts
consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the
benefits those laws confer. See [Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey] 505 U.S., at 887 (opinion of the Court) (performing this
balancing with respect to a spousal notification provision); id., at 899-901
(joint opinion of O’Connor, KENNEDY, and Souter, JJ.) (same balancing with
respect to a parental notification provision).
Id. (emphasis added) (parallel citations omitted).
149. See Elizabeth Price Foley, Whole Woman’s Health and the Supreme Court’s
Kaleidoscopic Review of Constitutional Rights, 2015-16 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 153, 172 (“The
Casey plurality assessed only the burdens of the medical emergency, informed consent,
parental consent, spousal notification, and recordkeeping provisions of Pennsylvania’s
abortion law.”).
150. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2309.
151. Id. at 2310.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Michael Dorf, Symposium: The Wages of Guerilla Warfare Against Abortion,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2016, 5:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposiumthe-wages-of-guerrilla-warfare-against-abortion/ (writing that some courts may not even
need to look at subjective legislative intent if they don’t want to and may instead look at the
factual, practical effects of the law(s) in question).
155. Ziegler, supra note 145.
156. See id. (“Those on both sides will have to pull together extensive, persuasive and
often expensive trial evidence about the effect and purpose of an abortion regulation.”).
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“The Court was clear,” Erwin Chemerinsky wrote soon after the
decision, “that the judiciary must carefully scrutinize laws restricting
abortion that are adopted with the purported justification of protecting
women’s health. The majority rejected judicial deference to legislatures.” 157
He added that the Court “stressed that in deciding whether a law imposes an
undue burden on abortion it is for the judiciary to balance the justifications
for the restrictions against their effect on the ability of women to have
access to abortions.” 158
Thus, if the undue-burden test were applied to evaluate the
constitutionality of a government-imposed TPM restriction on speech, it
would
1. Require the government to proffer a detailed factual record
demonstrating that the speech-restricting law actually serves and benefits a
significant interest;
2. Allow those challenging the government regulation to provide their
own factual evidence, including expert testimony, of the ways in which the
law unduly burdens the First Amendment freedom of speech to the point of
creating a substantial obstacle in conveying messages effectively; and
3. Require courts to (a) not defer to legislative judgment; (b) carefully
scrutinize the factual evidentiary record illustrating both the purported
benefits of the regulation in serving a significant governmental interest and
the alleged burdens on speakers, their messages, and audiences; and (c)
determine whether those burdens, viewed in the aggregate, impose a
substantial obstacle on the First Amendment freedom of speech.
In summary, Hellerstedt added muscle to the undue-burden standard by
requiring courts to factually assess and balance all interests involved—and
all benefits and burdens of the regulation—and by making it clear that
courts should not defer to legislative fact-findings or judgments. 159
Especially in light of the standard’s newfound clarity, then, Part II explains
why importing the doctrine into a different constitutional context seems
neither unusual nor surprising.

157. Erwin Chemerinsky, Everything Changed: October Term 2015, 19 GREEN BAG 2d
343, 355 (2016).
158. Id.
159. See Foley, supra note 149, at 175 (observing that in Hellerstedt the majority
“provided no deference at all to the Texas legislature’s factual findings regarding the
benefits to be derived from the admitting-privileges or surgical-center provisions,” while
simultaneously “deferring to the district court’s findings of fact”).
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II. Borrowing the Undue-Burden Standard from Abortion Cases:
A Tradition of Cutting Across Constitutional Domains
The possibility of borrowing the undue-burden standard from the realm
of substantive due process in abortion-restriction cases and applying it to
First Amendment speech disputes should not be startling. 160 That is
because, as Professor Randall Kelso writes, “[t]he structure of modern First
Amendment free speech doctrine . . . has evolved consistent with the more
formalized structure of doctrine under modern Equal Protection and Due
Process review.” 161
Writing more than forty years ago in the University of Chicago Law
Review, Professor Kenneth Karst observed that “[i]n a number of recent
cases involving first amendment interests, the Supreme Court has used the
framework of equal protection analysis to limit government’s power to
restrict free expression.” 162 Karst pointed to the Court’s opinion in Police
Department of Chicago v. Mosley 163 as “fully” 164 enunciating the principle
that “equal liberty of expression is inherent in the first amendment.” 165 In
Mosley, the Court considered the constitutionality of a municipal picketing
ordinance. 166 The ordinance distinguished protected from unprotected
speech based on subject matter, as it allowed “[p]eaceful picketing on the
subject of a school’s labor-management dispute” 167 but banned “all other
peaceful picketing.” 168 In holding the regulation unconstitutional and
delivering the Court’s opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall explained that
under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First
Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum
160. See generally Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH.
L. REV. 459 (2010) (providing a thorough overview of “constitutional borrowing”).
161. R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny,
Intermediate Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 291 (2016);
see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV.
297, 304 (1997) (“Although the three-tiered approach is rooted in the Equal Protection
Clause, it has spread to other areas of constitutional law. In recent years, the Court’s First
Amendment free speech jurisprudence, originally distinct from its equal protection
jurisprudence, has entirely succumbed to the tiered-review model.”).
162. Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 20, 20–21 (1975).
163. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
164. Karst, supra note 162, at 26.
165. Id.
166. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92–93.
167. Id. at 95.
168. Id.
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to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.
And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or
debating in public facilities. There is an “equality of status in the
field of ideas,” and government must afford all points of view an
equal opportunity to be heard. 169
More recently, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in Simon & Schuster,
Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board 170 that the
requirements under strict scrutiny in First Amendment jurisprudence that a
law must serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly drawn “derive[]
from our equal protection jurisprudence.” 171 Tracing back through a line of
free speech cases, 172 Kennedy contends that “a principle of equal protection
[was] transformed into one about the government’s power to regulate the
content of speech in a public forum, and from this to a more general First
Amendment statement about the government’s power to regulate the
content of speech.” 173 Thus, the strict-scrutiny doctrine today “spans equal
protection, substantive due process, and the First Amendment.” 174
Similarly, as Professor Jeffery Shaman writes, the intermediate-scrutiny
standard “was first developed in equal protection cases” 175 and then was
“imported for use in First Amendment cases concerning commercial
speech . . . and in those freedom of speech cases in which restrictions of
expression are unrelated to its ideological content.” 176 Professor Bhagwat
notes that the evolution of a unified intermediate-scrutiny standard in First
Amendment jurisprudence “paralleled, and drew upon, the emergence of an

169. Id. at 96 (footnote omitted) (quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1948).
170. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
171. Id. at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
172. Among the key cases cited by Justice Kennedy is Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980), in which the Court wrote that “[w]hen government regulation discriminates among
speech-related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the
legislation be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests, and the justifications offered
for any distinctions it draws must be carefully scrutinized.” Id. at 461–62.
173. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 125 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
174. Roy G. Spece, Jr. & David Yokum, Scrutinizing Strict Scrutiny, 40 VT. L. REV. 285,
317 (2015).
175. Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels
of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 161, 163 (1984).
176. Id.
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intermediate scrutiny tier of review as the test for sex discrimination in the
equal protection arena[].” 177
The bottom line is that First Amendment jurisprudence long has
borrowed doctrinal principles from other realms of constitutional law. Thus,
to dip into the sphere of Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
and, in particular, the undue-burden standard fits within the historical
trajectory of First Amendment doctrinal development. The next part
explains and defends the relevance of the undue-burden standard as a
potential facet of intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment.
III. Exploring the Application of the Undue-Burden Standard
in Free-Speech Cases Involving Intermediate Scrutiny
This part includes two sections. Initially, Section A identifies five
reasons why the undue-burden standard fits well within intermediate
scrutiny as applied to TPM restrictions on expression. Section B then
operationalizes the meaning of undue burden within a free-speech context
and identifies variables that courts should consider in evaluating whether a
TPM regulation imposes an undue burden on freedom of speech.
A. The Nexus Between Undue Burden and Intermediate Scrutiny
There are at least five reasons why merging the undue-burden standard
with intermediate scrutiny is prudent and appealing. First, both the undueburden and intermediate-scrutiny standards apply where the government
does not completely prohibit conduct or speech, but instead imposes
regulatory hurdles or impediments that make engaging in such activity or
expression more difficult and challenging. For example, Texas did not ban
abortions in Hellerstedt. Instead, it instituted admitting-privileges and
surgical-center requirements that made obtaining an abortion more difficult,
and the Court applied the undue-burden standard to measure their
constitutionality. 178
Similarly, Massachusetts in McCullen v. Coakley 179 did not ban people
from communicating with women approaching facilities that perform
abortions. Instead, it imposed buffer zones around such clinics that made it
more difficult to speak with individuals entering them, and the majority
applied the intermediate-scrutiny standard to measure their

177. Bhagwat, supra note 4, at 784.
178. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
179. 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
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constitutionality. 180 In brief, both the undue-burden and intermediatescrutiny tests are designed for evaluating burdens, not bans.
Second, application of the undue-burden standard in the context of
intermediate scrutiny comports with the current “balancing-oriented” 181
nature of intermediate scrutiny. Indeed, Justice Elena Kagan has described
content-neutral regulations of speech as being “usually . . . subject to a
fairly loose balancing test.” 182 And Professor Alan Brownstein writes that
the judicial standard for evaluating content-neutral TPM regulations is “a
multifactor balancing test.” 183 He adds that “[t]he burden imposed by a
content-neutral law . . . no matter how egregious it may be, is always
balanced against the state interest being furthered by the restriction on
speech.” 184
The undue-burden test, as articulated in Hellerstedt, also amounts to a
“benefits-and-burdens balancing test.” 185 Indeed, Professor Brownstein
noted the similarities between the undue-burden test and intermediate
scrutiny more than two decades ago, writing that “under both the Casey
standard and the balancing test applied to content-neutral regulations, laws
that serve permissible goals are evaluated as to their impact on the exercise
of fundamental rights to determine if they are excessively burdensome.” 186
Similarly, Professors Jud Mathews and Alec Stone Sweet observed in 2011
that the undue-burden standard, “like the move to intermediate scrutiny, is a
means to allow courts to consider the interests on both sides of a
constitutional controversy.” 187
Justice Breyer, who authored the Hellerstedt majority opinion, used the
language of burdens in describing the intermediate-scrutiny test he applied
when concurring in United States v. Alvarez. 188 As Breyer wrote there, the
180. Id. at 2534–35.
181. Han, supra note 8, at 396.
182. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 443 (1996).
183. Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in
Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 920 (1994).
184. Id. at 923.
185. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2324 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); see Thomas J. Molony, Fulfilling the Promise of Roe: A Pathway for
Meaningful Pre-Abortion Consultation, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 713, 734 (2016) (referring to
“the balancing test described in Hellerstedt”).
186. Brownstein, supra note 183, at 925.
187. Jud Mathews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights
Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 854 (2011).
188. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
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Court had to “ask whether it is possible substantially to achieve the
Government’s objective in less burdensome ways.” 189
Third, the undue-burden standard subsumes the current concern under
intermediate scrutiny with the availability of ample alternative channels of
communication. 190 In particular, if use of alternative channels of
communication left open by a TPM regulation would impose a greater
fiscal cost to a speaker and/or require substantially more time and energy in
order to convey, as effectively, the same message, then such heightened
costs are evidence under the undue-burden analysis weighing against
constitutional validity. 191 In other words, forcing speakers to embrace
avenues of communication that carry greater monetary or human-capital
outlays may constitute undue burdens. Alternative avenues of
communication may not be ample—as in sufficient or adequate 192—when
they create undue burdens for speakers.
Fourth, both the undue-burden standard and the intermediate-scrutiny
test are intended to be somewhat easier to surmount than strict scrutiny but
more demanding than rational basis review. 193 In other words, the undueburden and intermediate-scrutiny tests ostensibly aim for the same level of
judicial review. In fact, several scholars consider the undue-burden standard

189. Id. at 2555 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Breyer wrote that the
circumstances in Alvarez “lead me to apply what the Court has termed ‘intermediate
scrutiny’ here.” Id. at 2552.
190. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text (describing this prong of the current
intermediate-scrutiny test).
191. See infra notes 221-224 and accompanying text (describing this in greater detail in
the context of the Supreme Court’s ruling in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994)).
192. Ample, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/ample (last visited
May 12, 2017).
193. See Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional
Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 417 (2008) (noting that “the strongest presumption
of unconstitutionality [is] reflected in the strict-scrutiny test,” while “[m]any, if not most,
constitutional rights are protected by the lesser presumptions of the undue burden and
intermediate scrutiny tests, or by what is effectively the nonpresumption reflected in the two
types of rational basis tests” (emphasis added)); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, What the Abortion
Disclosure Cases Say About the Constitutionality of Persuasive Government Speech on
Product Labels, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 855, 860 (2010) (describing intermediate scrutiny as “a
standard between the rigorous strict scrutiny that applies to other speech regulations and the
rational basis standard that the Court uses to review regulations that do not implicate the free
speech right”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REV. 22, 61 (1992) (“The label ‘intermediate scrutiny’ situates these standards
between the bipolar rule-like tiers of strict review and rationality review.”).
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a form of intermediate scrutiny. 194 Professor Adam Winkler adds that “the
undue burden test is clearly more tolerant of regulation than traditional
strict scrutiny.” 195
Fifth—and perhaps most importantly, at least from the perspective of
First Amendment advocates—the undue-burden test, as articulated in
Hellerstedt, would add significant teeth to an intermediate-scrutiny standard
often criticized as too weak. 196 In fact, in arguing against the majority’s
decision in Hellerstedt, Justice Clarence Thomas opined that the undueburden standard now looks “far more like the strict-scrutiny standard” 197
than it did in Casey. Similarly, in applying the undue-burden standard in
July 2016, an Ohio appellate court observed that the Court in Hellerstedt
“set forth a more exacting undue burden standard.” 198
On top of this, the undue-burden standard fleshed out in Hellerstedt is
favorable to free speech in the face of government regulation because, as
Dean Chemerinsky notes, “[t]he majority rejected judicial deference to
legislatures.” 199 This is critical for improving protection of free expression
because, in contrast, the intermediate-scrutiny standard for TPM regulations
has been described by former Stanford Law School Dean Kathleen Sullivan
as “relatively deferential.”200 Stripping away deference from intermediate
194. See Edith L. Pacillo, Expanding the Feminist Imagination: An Analysis of
Reproductive Rights, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 113, 117 n.20 (1997) (“The Court’s singular
‘undue burden’ standard is reminiscent of the Court’s ‘intermediate scrutiny’ standard
created to differentiate between racial classifications and gender classifications.”); Paulsen,
supra note 1, at 398 (asserting that the undue-burden standard “seems to be some form of
intermediate scrutiny”); Roy G. Spece, Jr., The Purpose Prong of Casey’s Undue Burden
Test and Its Impact on the Constitutionality of Abortion Insurance Restrictions in the
Affordable Care Act or Its Progeny, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 77, 79 (2011) (asserting that after
Casey, the right to an abortion “is protected by the intermediate scrutiny of the undue burden
test rather than by strict scrutiny” (emphasis added)). But see Erin Daly, supra note 118, at
144 n.345 (asserting that the undue-burden standard is distinguished “from intermediate
scrutiny in that it does not permit the government to justify the regulation: even the most
compelling purpose will not save a law if it is found to impose an undue burden”).
195. Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST.
COMMENT. 227, 235 (2006).
196. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
197. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2326 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
198. Capital Care Network of Toledo v. State Dep’t of Health, 58 N.E.3d 1207, 1215
(Ohio Ct. App. 2016) (emphasis added), appeal allowed sub nom. Capital Care Network of
Toledo v. Ohio Dep't of Health, 71 N.E.3d 297 (Ohio Mar. 15, 2017) (table decision).
199. Chemerinsky, supra note 157, at 355.
200. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution, and City Regulation of Speech,
25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 209, 217 (1998).
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scrutiny in First Amendment jurisprudence is crucial, given “that
deference’s elasticity makes it ripe for misuse and abuse that often leave
First Amendment rights hanging out to dry.” 201 Jettisoning deference from
the intermediate-scrutiny equation would help to ensure that intermediate
scrutiny truly is a standard that, as Professor David Han contends, “does not
preordain victory for one side or the other.” 202
In brief, the undue-burden standard comports with intermediate
scrutiny’s present framework as a balancing test that falls somewhere below
the rigor of strict scrutiny while simultaneously adding strength to
intermediate-scrutiny review by (a) mandating vigilant judicial review of
the factual record, (b) requiring thorough analysis of both benefits and
burdens imposed by regulations, (c) denying deference to legislative
judgments, and (d) limiting judicial discretion. Judicial discretion is limited
by requiring more in-depth factual analysis instead of speculation regarding
benefits and burdens. In addition, replacing both the narrow-tailoring and
ample-alternative-channels prongs of intermediate scrutiny with the undueburden approach streamlines intermediate scrutiny to a two-part test—one
requiring a significant government interest served by a regulation that does
not unduly burden speech. This change thereby eliminates the danger of
conflating the current second and third prongs described by Professor
Wright. 203
B. Operationalizing Undue Burden Within Intermediate Scrutiny
How might the undue-burden standard operate as the second prong of an
intermediate-scrutiny test for reviewing content-neutral TPM regulations?
First, identification of a government interest as “significant” under
intermediate scrutiny would be determined independently from the question
of whether a regulation actually serves that interest without imposing an
undue burden on speech. In other words, the undue-burden facet of a
reformulated intermediate-scrutiny standard would apply only to the
“means” side of the equation, not to the “ends.” This comports with the
two-pronged nature of strict scrutiny, in which recognition of a compelling
government interest is independent from the question of whether the

201. Clay Calvert & Justin B. Hayes, To Defer or Not to Defer? Deference and Its
Differential Impact on First Amendment Rights in the Roberts Court, 63 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 13, 17 (2012).
202. Han, supra note 8, at 399–400.
203. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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regulation in question restricts no more speech than is necessary to serve
that interest. 204
Second, the undue-burden prong of a refashioned intermediate-scrutiny
test would require courts to consider, per the majority’s balancing analysis
in Hellerstedt, the benefits of a government regulation of expression, as
well as the burdens it imposes on the First Amendment right of free speech.
Because the Hellerstedt explication of the undue-burden test eliminates
legislative deference, the government must put into the judicial record
factual proof of the actual benefits that any given TPM restriction serves.
The government would need to substantiate, in other words, that prior to
imposing the regulation, its allegedly significant interest sustained actual
harm that was mitigated or reduced after the regulation was imposed. Put
differently, the government would need pre-regulation and post-regulation
comparison points to demonstrate actual alleviation or mitigation of a
problem to show a benefit toward the significant government interest.
Such a requirement comports squarely with the intermediate-scrutiny
standard already deployed by the Supreme Court in the commercial speech
arena. 205 As the Court wrote more than thirty-five years ago in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 206 the
government must prove that “the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted.” 207 In other words, the government must
demonstrate that there is a direct benefit from the regulation of speech. The
Court later elaborated in Edenfield v. Fane 208 that “a governmental body
seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that
the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them
to a material degree.” 209 The Edenfield Court added that “[t]his burden is
not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture.”210
In context of TPM regulations, adding Hellerstedt’s undue-burden
approach to intermediate scrutiny brings the test much more in line with the
variation of intermediate scrutiny already applied in commercial-speech
cases by forcing the government to prove direct, material benefits from a
204. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text (comparing strict scrutiny with
intermediate scrutiny on the ends/means prongs of both current tests).
205. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554 (2001) (noting that the Court
has “developed a framework for analyzing regulations of commercial speech that is
‘substantially similar’ to the test for time, place, and manner restrictions”).
206. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
207. Id. at 566 (emphasis added).
208. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
209. Id. at 770–71 (emphasis added).
210. Id. at 770.
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regulation. Speculation and conjecture simply won’t suffice; 211 as in
Hellerstedt, a factual record of benefits is one key necessary for a
regulation to withstand an undue-burden analysis as imported into
intermediate scrutiny.
Furthermore, the degree or size of the purported benefit of a contentneutral restriction on expression must be considered, relative to all other
variables that also may negatively impact the government’s asserted
significant interest. For instance, if the government alleges that a significant
interest in aesthetics is served by banning residential, yard-posted signs
over a certain size, regardless of the subject matter of those signs, then the
benefits to the aesthetics of the community wrought by this regulation
would need to be placed within a macro-context of other factors
detrimentally affecting community aesthetics. Although there might be a
benefit to aesthetics from such a size-of-sign regulation, the level of
improvement to the overall aesthetics of the community—the magnitude of
the benefit—might be insignificant or de minimis because so many other
unregulated variables may continue to plague community aesthetics.212 Per
Edenfield, this would not provide a benefit “to a material degree.” 213
Trying to fathom the actual size or scale of the regulatory benefit is vital
because it must be weighed against the burdens imposed on speech. The
smaller the size or degree of the benefit, in turn, the more likely it is to be
outweighed by burdens imposed on First Amendment rights in the undueburden formulation.
Importantly, evaluating the magnitude of the actual benefit to the
government’s interest under the undue-burden approach blends seamlessly
with the Supreme Court’s underinclusivity doctrine. As Chief Justice John
Roberts recently explained in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 214
“[u]nderinclusivity creates a First Amendment concern when the State
regulates one aspect of a problem while declining to regulate a different
aspect of the problem that affects its stated interest in a comparable
way.” 215 Put differently, if the government regulates too little speech to
prevent or mitigate a particular type of harm—the harm constituting “the
211. Id.
212. Although a quality such as aesthetics may seem subjective, Hellerstedt would
suggest that expert testimony is relevant here. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,
136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016). Testimony from community planning and development
experts would seem very pertinent to such an inquiry.
213. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771 (emphasis added).
214. 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015).
215. Id. at 1670.
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problem,” 216 as Roberts called it—that “vast swaths” 217 of unregulated
speech continue to produce, then a law may be fatally underinclusive. As
attorney James Ianelli explains, a statute is underinclusive if it “fails to
reach much of the speech that implicates the government’s interest.”218
In brief, Hellerstedt’s emphasis on the degree of a demonstrable benefit
from a government regulation 219 under the undue-burden standard comports
with the Supreme Court’s concern regarding the constitutionality of laws
that confer de minimis benefits. Adding the undue-burden analysis to
intermediate scrutiny, in other words, provides a built-in mechanism for
ferreting out underinclusive TPM restrictions.
In addition to the government’s obligation to proffer evidence of the
benefits of a TPM regulation, the undue-burden standard would afford
those attacking the regulation the opportunity to demonstrate how the
regulation imposes an undue burden on First Amendment speech rights. To
better understand the burdens that might be imposed on expression by a
content-neutral TPM, it is useful to divide potential burdens into three
categories. Specifically, burdens from a TPM regulation might befall:
• speakers;
• audiences; and
• messages.
The question becomes whether, when viewed collectively across these
three domains (speaker, audience, and message), the burdens rise in the
aggregate to the level of—per the nomenclature of the undue-burden test—
a substantial obstacle or obstacles on freedom of expression. 220
How might a TPM regulation burden speakers? By restricting a
particular mode, venue, or timeframe for expression (or some combination
thereof), a TPM regulation can force speakers both to spend more money
and to devote greater time and effort to convey their message in a way that
may or may not be as effective as the method prohibited by the regulation.
In other words, the burdens on speakers who attempt to convey a message
in a manner as efficacious as that thwarted by a TPM regulation may be
both fiscal and exertive. The Supreme Court made it clear in City of Ladue
v. Gilleo 221 that eliminating “an unusually cheap and convenient” 222 method
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id.
Id. at 1668.
James Ianelli, Noncitizens and Citizens United, 56 LOY. L. REV. 869, 901 (2010).
See supra notes 149-153 and accompanying text.
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
512 U.S. 43 (1994).
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of communication may be grounds for striking down a TPM regulation. 223
A particular mode of communication—in Gilleo, it was yard signs—may be
“both unique and important.” 224
Consider, for instance, a TPM regulation that prohibits leafletting
directly to people within fifteen yards of City Hall between the business
hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. in order to serve significant interests in (1)
the ingress and egress of government employees, lobbyists, and other
visitors to and from the building; and (2) safe facilitation of all foot traffic
on the narrow and normally crowded sidewalks that surround the
building. 225 With this low-cost and direct approach to communicating a
message to those who may hold positions of (or be influencers of)
government power blocked, a speaker would need to adopt more expensive
and time-intensive measures—and, importantly, less direct ways—of trying
to reach his or her desired audience. Those might include, for example,
having to (1) purchase newspaper, television, and/or Internet
advertisements; (2) send mass mailings; and (3) rent billboard space.
A TPM regulation can also burden audiences—something a
comprehensive and detailed undue-burden approach to intermediate
scrutiny would address. In particular, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized an unenumerated First Amendment right to receive speech. 226
As Professor Catherine Ross explains, “[t]he right to receive information is
a corollary of the right to speak.” 227 Indeed, “courts have recognized in a
222. Id. at 57.
223. The Court in Gilleo assumed, for the sake of argument, “the validity of the City’s
submission that the various exemptions are free of impermissible content or viewpoint
discrimination.” Id. at 53.
224. Id. at 54.
225. The sidewalks in this scenario are adjacent to busy streets on all four sides of City
Hall, and pedestrians would need to step into the streets and into oncoming vehicular traffic
were the sidewalks to become blocked.
226. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (observing that
“the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the
spectrum of available knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and press includes not
only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, [and] the
right to read” (emphasis added)); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)
(asserting that the First Amendment “freedom embraces the right to distribute literature and
necessarily protects the right to receive it” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
227. Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State’s Interest in Protecting
Children from Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427, 477 (2000). Professor Marc
Blitz adds that a listener’s right to receive information “is simply the mirror image of the
speaker’s right to express it. And the First Amendment cannot protect one without
meaningfully protecting the other.” Marc J. Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent
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variety of contexts that a right to free speech is not held just by speakers.
Listeners, too, have a First Amendment right to receive speech.”228
Thus, in considering the constitutionality of a TPM regulation, a court
would need to consider how the regulation burdens the ability of potential
audience members to receive speech. For example, an ordinance banning or
limiting the number of all newsracks, regardless of the content of the
publications they hold, in a particular space or location detrimentally affects
not merely the right of publishers to convey speech, but also the right of
individuals who may want to receive speech. Similarly, an ordinance
limiting the number and size of yard signs that may be posted on a plot of
residential property affects not only a homeowner’s right to speak—perhaps
regarding political candidates or ballot initiatives—but also her neighbors’
ability to know how others, whom they may respect or loathe, might be
voting.
Finally, it is important for courts to consider how a message itself may
be burdened by needing to take on a different form or be conveyed via
another medium because of a TPM restriction. In other words, some modes
and manners of message conveyance may be more efficacious than others,
not only in terms of reaching a certain quantity of people, but also in terms
of attracting attention, gaining understanding, facilitating persuasion and
being remembered. Here, communication science229 might prove useful in
helping courts to understand why a TPM regulation that thwarts a particular
mode or manner of communication unduly burdens the underlying
message. 230 The use of expert testimony and data-driven findings in such
areas comports with the Hellerstedt majority’s deployment of the undueburden standard in analyzing the benefits and burdens in that case.231

Experiments in Living: Libraries, the Right to Read, and a First Amendment Theory for an
Unaccompanied Right to Receive Information, 74 UMKC L. REV. 799, 809 (2006).
228. Jennifer A. Chandler, A Right to Reach an Audience: An Approach to Intermediary
Bias on the Internet, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095, 1100 (2007).
229. See Charles R. Berger & Steven H. Chaffee, The Study of Communication as a
Science, in HANDBOOK OF COMMUNICATION SCIENCE 15, 17 (Charles R. Berger & Steven H.
Chaffee eds., 1987) (“Communication science seeks to understand the production,
processing, and effects of symbol and signal systems by developing testable theories,
containing lawful generalizations, that explain phenomena associated with production,
processing, and effects.”).
230. See generally JEREMY COHEN & TIMOTHY GLEASON, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN
COMMUNICATION AND LAW (1990) (providing an overview of the ways in which research
from the field of communication may help inform the law regarding message effects).
231. See supra notes 151–154 and accompanying text.
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In considering the burdens imposed on a message, a comprehensive
undue-burden analysis must also address what the Supreme Court in Cohen
v. California 232 called the “dual communicative function” 233 of speech. As
Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote in Cohen, speech “conveys not only
ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise
inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for
their emotive as their cognitive force.” 234
In turn, some modes of message conveyance may be more effective than
others in demonstrating the depth of a speaker’s passion and fervor for her
message. For example, a TPM regulation limiting the decibel level of
speech and/or banning speech-amplifying devices, such as microphones and
bullhorns, arguably reduces the emotional impact of spoken words. If the
alternative left open by such a regulation is the distribution of printed words
on leaflets, then the emotive force of seeing and hearing a person express
her views in a loud, passionate manner is burdened.
Similarly, a content-neutral TPM regulation that limits billboards or yard
signs to only words restricts the emotive force of a message conveyed by
images. A text-only billboard stating, “Abortion Kills the Innocent,” for
instance, may not pack the same degree of emotive and persuasive force as
an image of a mangled fetus. 235 As UCLA Professor Eugene Volokh
asserts, “photographs can expose that which is otherwise hidden, with a
vividness that words often cannot capture; images of aborted fetuses are an
especially apt example.” 236
In summary, analysis of the burdens spread across the domains of
speakers, audience members, and messages would collectively help the
judiciary determine if the burden imposed on First Amendment rights is
undue when balanced against the government-proven benefits of a TPM
regulation. A demonstrably slight government-proven benefit might well be
outweighed by aggregate burdens that are tantamount to a substantial
obstacle in the way of First Amendment free expression.

232. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
233. Id. at 26.
234. Id.
235. See Clay Calvert et al., Gruesome Images, Shocking Speech & Harm to Minors:
Judicial Pushback Against the First Amendment After Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association?, 13 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 127, 155–58 (2014) (providing an overview of the
power of images relative to those of words).
236. Eugene Volokh, Gruesome Speech, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 904 (2015).
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IV. Conclusion
Intermediate scrutiny today, Professor Lillian R. BeVier asserts, “has
become the practical equivalent of lenient, rational basis review.” 237
Professor Susan Williams concurs that intermediate scrutiny, as it applies to
TPM regulations, is a “fairly lenient standard.” 238 That is bad news, of
course, for advocates of free expression.
This article thus proposed importing the Supreme Court’s undue-burden
test from the realm of abortion-restriction cases like Hellerstedt into the
intermediate-scrutiny standard of review for content-neutral TPM
restrictions of expression. The proposal, in turn, called for eliminating both
the narrow-tailoring and ample-alternative-channels prongs of the current
intermediate-scrutiny test, while retaining the significant-interest facet.
As argued above, the undue-burden standard articulated and applied by
the Hellerstedt majority provides a more free-speech-friendly approach for
evaluating TPM regulations by eliminating deference to lawmakers and
requiring a fact-intensive, judicial inquiry into both the benefits of
regulations and their burdens on First Amendment rights. Justice Elena
Kagan once characterized the current version of intermediate scrutiny as
providing “a fairly loose balancing test.” 239 Blending in the undue-burden
standard as clarified in Hellerstedt provides a key mechanism for reducing
such looseness and elasticity, while preserving a balancing approach that
adds muscle in deference-free fashion. Stripping away deference is
important if intermediate scrutiny is to live up to its potential as a test that
“allows the Court to take a neutral stance that favors neither the government
nor the party challenging it.” 240
Although the undue-burden standard may be criticized as nothing more
than a balancing test that provides the judiciary with leeway for its own
discretion, it is important to remember that intermediate scrutiny already
involves balancing. 241 Furthermore, as the Introduction made clear,
intermediate scrutiny has gained importance in First Amendment
jurisprudence. 242 Given this heightened value of intermediate scrutiny to
free-speech jurisprudence, it is critical to review and reconsider the current

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

BeVier, supra note 57, at 1293.
Williams, supra note 25, at 644.
Kagan, supra note 182, at 443.
Shaman, supra note 175, at 163.
See supra notes 181-189 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
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standard as to how it might be improved. Doctrines, after all, are not set in
stone, but are judicial creations that can evolve. 243
The proposal here is presented for scholarly and judicial consideration
and critique as a possible means of shoring up intermediate scrutiny in a
way that makes it more difficult for the government to sustain regulations
on expression. No series of brief hypothetical ordinances like those
suggested in Section B of Part III, of course, can ever possibly capture all of
the nuances of how a court might apply an intermediate-scrutiny standard
that requires the government to demonstrate a significant interest and to
show that a regulation does not unduly burden First Amendment rights.
Indeed, Hellerstedt deployed the undue-burden standard in a highly factintensive, evidentiary manner. 244 Requiring courts to non-deferentially
examine what Justice Breyer called “record evidence” 245 provided by the
government of an actual benefit served by a TPM regulation and, in turn, to
weigh the size and scope of that benefit against demonstrable burdens
imposed on First Amendment rights across the domains of speakers,
audiences, and messages would mark a significant step toward eliminating
substantial obstacles in the marketplace of ideas. 246

243. See Delphine Nougayrède, Yukos, Investment Round-Tripping, and the Evolving
Public/Private Paradigms, 26 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 337, 349 (2015) (noting that “judicial
doctrines are not set in stone and can change over time to adapt to new circumstances”).
244. See supra notes 143-146 and accompanying text. The types of evidence in the
judicial record that Breyer lauded the district court for considering included, among other
things, “expert evidence, presented in stipulations, depositions, and testimony.” Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016).
245. Id. at 2316.
246. The marketplace of ideas theory is “one of the most powerful images of free speech,
both for legal thinkers and for laypersons.” MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH:
FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND THE CHALLENGE OF INTERDISCIPLINARITY 2 (2001). It pivots
on the assumption that free speech “contributes to the promotion of truth.” Daniel J. Solove,
The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 Duke
L.J. 967, 998 (2003). Justice Anthony Kennedy reaffirmed this maxim and the power of the
marketplace metaphor in United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012), writing for the
plurality that “[t]he theory of our Constitution is ‘that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.’” Id. at 2550 (quoting
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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